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Abstract
We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors.
The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the avail-
able land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution. Our
results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per
unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price.
Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only
when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant
with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price.
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1 Introduction
Assume that there exists a single tenant that needs to negotiate with several
lessors for the use of their land. Examples may arise in natural resource
exploitation, construction of public or private facilities, or urbanization in
populated areas. In particular, management of land and natural resources
is one of the most critical challenges facing developing countries (Kaye and
Yahya, 2012; van der Ploeg and Rohner, 2012). Conflicts between firms
and indigenous communities have recently been arising in many countries in
Latin America, Africa and Asia. Examples are numerous (Welker, 2009; Sosa,
2011; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011; Akiwumi, 2014; Tetreault, 2015; Sarkar, 2015;
Walter and Urkidi, 2017; Sarkar, 2017; Nguyen et al., 2018; Fraser, 2018).
Another examples arise as restitution problems where two agents have rights
over the land (Jaramillo et al., 2014) or as land aggregating for housing and
infrastructure (Kominers and Weyl, 2012).
In these land conflicts, each side has their own legal right over the land.
As pointed out by Valencia-Toledo and Vidal-Puga (2019) for the case of
mining activities, Article 10 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous People states that “indigenous communities have the right to
give or withhold its consent to proposed projects that may affect the land
they customarily own, occupy or otherwise use” (UN, 2007). Moreover, the
mining firm has a potential investment and/or concession over those lands.
Even when such a concession is not granted yet, the firm may have a high
enough profit opportunity to make it possible to compensate the land owners
in a fair way (Helwege, 2015).
The case of conflict between the mining industry and indigenous com-
munities in Peru (Sosa, 2011) is paradigmatic. The Southern Copper Cor-
poration (SCC) is a company that has the right to exploit the underground
resources in the southern Peruvian region. However, this land is customary
used by local residents, who have the right to use the surface.
A possible approach to solve the conflict is from a centralized point of
view. A planner, for example the government, determines a fair compensation
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for the use of land. This is the idea of market design approach applied to land
problems. See Sen (2007) for a survey. Recent different approaches in this
direction are proposed by Sarkar (2017) and Valencia-Toledo and Vidal-Puga
(2018, 2019).
However, the Peruvian government did not try this option and, instead,
encouraged both sides to reach an agreement by themselves. Even though the
protocol of negotiation is undetermined, we can still try to figure out how this
negotiation may take place. We study this situation from a non-cooperative
game perspective.
This is the approach taken by Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004), who mod-
eled the negotiation process that took place between villagers and the au-
thorities in order to construct pipelines to connect individual houses to a
water dam.
In order to follow a similar idea, we analyze the potential negotiation
between the SCC and the local communities by taking into account a real
situation that took place in Galicia, Spain. A military base1 was established
in 1968 over the land owned by three land communities (named Salcedo, Vi-
laboa and Figueirido, respectively). In October 2008, due to the government
decision to create a wide security perimeter around the base, these land com-
munities engaged in a lawsuit claiming to be the rightful owners of the land.
In November 2012, the Spanish Court of Justice settled in favor of the local
communities.
As local communities are the rightful owners of the land, the government
was legally compelled to reach an agreement with them. We can identify the
government as a single tenant and Salcedo, Vilaboa and Figueirido commu-
nities as lessors who negotiated on a price per unit of land and a quantity of
land through a negotiation process. The final stage of this negotiation pro-
cess, as reported by the local media, followed a cheap talk stage, that lasted
almost one year, until the government made a final sequential negotiation
round with each community separately. The assented protocol stated that, if
1The Airborne Light Infantry Brigade, or Brigada Ligera AeroTranspotada (BRILAT).
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a community agreed on a price, and, later on, the price increased for another
community, then it will automatically increase for the former, without re-
peating the negotiation. Moreover, any agreement between the government
and one community was conditional on reaching a minimum amount of land
at the end of the process. At the end, the tenant rented 121 Ha of land which
was less than total available (around 216 Ha).
In this paper, we model the above protocol assuming that lessors are
agents that want to increase the price, and that the single tenant is an agent
who wants to decrease it.
This situation has many similarities with the negotiation problem between
SCC and the indigenous communities in Peru: there are one tenant and
several lessors; the identities of the lessors are loose (land customary in Peru,
and the possible presence of more communities in Spain); the tenant does
not necessarily need all the land; and, even though negotiation protocol is
undetermined, the tenant is the one who takes the initiative.
In our model, the tenant sequentially negotiates with each lessor, follow-
ing a pre-established ordering (which can be established in advance by the
own tenant). In each stage, there exists a bargaining problem between the
tenant and the lessor. We formalize the non-cooperative game in each stage
as the alternating offer model defined by Binmore et al. (1986) and also used
by Herrero (1989), which yields the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950)
when the bargaining problem is convex.
In practice, this implies that agents reach an agreement given by the
Nash bargaining solution. Hence, even though the Nash solution has a solid
axiomatic justification, the reason to use it here is non-cooperative. In fact,
the Nash solution arises in equilibrium in many natural two-player negoti-
ation processes, such as those modeled by Nash (1953), Rubinstein (1982),
Binmore et al. (1986), Van Damme (1986), Herrero (1989) or Papatya and
Trockel (2016). There are also protocols with more than two players, but the
results are either not so satisfactory, as they need refinements in the equi-
librium concept, such as stationary strategies (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1996,
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2010; Trockel, 2002), or not applicable to our setting, as they restrict to pure
bargaining problems (Chae and Yang, 1994; Krishna and Serrano, 1996; Suh
and Wen, 2006; Bergantin˜os et al., 2007). Non-cooperative foundations of
other bargaining solutions, such as the Kalai-Smorodinsky and the discrete
Raiffa solutions, use some counter-intuitive features, such as bids on proba-
bilities (Moulin, 1984) or the existence of a finite predetermined number of
stages (St˚ahl, 1972).
Matsushima and Shinohara (2015) also use the Nash solution as a way
to identify the agreements in indeterminate non-cooperative settings. As
opposed to this paper, they use the Nash solution in bargaining problems
with more than two players.
In this paper, we study two cases: In the first case, we assume that the
tenant has the freedom to negotiate different prices per unit of land for each
lessor (i.e. prices are lessor-dependent). We call this case as the non-uniform
price case. In the second case, we assume that all the prices are updated, at
the end of the process, to the highest price agreed upon. We call this case as
the uniform price case. One of our results is that the uniform price case if
more favorable for the tenant than the non-uniform price case, which seems
to justify the fact that one of the first announces made by the government
was that they would pay the same price per hectare to all communities.
According to our model, this leads to the most favorable case for them.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce the notation and the general non-cooperative protocol. In Sec-
tion 3, we illustrate the non-cooperative protocol with an example with two
lessors. In Section 4, we present the results for the unanimity case with a
discontinuous profit function. In Section 5, we present the results for the
non-unanimity case with two players and a discontinuous profit function. In
Section 6, we study the non-unanimity case with two players and a continuous
profit function. In Section 7, we present some concluding remarks.
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2 The model
We denote the set of non-negative real numbers as R+, and the set of positive
real numbers as R++. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a generic finite set. For any
S ⊆ N , RS is the Euclidean space of dimension |S| whose coordinates are
indexed by the elements of S. When |S| = 2 and there is no ambiguity,
we write R2 instead of RS. Given y ∈ RS, we write y(S) = ∑i∈S yi. We
denote by 0N and 1N ∈ RN , the vectors whose coordinates are all 0 and 1,
respectively. Given x, y ∈ RN we write x ≤ y when xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ N .
Given S, T ⊂ N , S∩T = ∅, x ∈ RS and y ∈ RT , we define z = (x, y) ∈ RS∪T
as the combination of x and y, i.e. zi = xi for all i ∈ S and zi = yi for all
i ∈ T . For simplicity, given i ∈ N , T ⊆ N \{i}, x ∈ RT , and h ∈ R, we write
(h, x) ∈ R{i}∪T instead of ((h), x), and so on. Given A,B ⊂ RS, we define
A+B = {a+ b : a ∈ A, b ∈ B} ⊂ RS.
A two-person bargaining problem is a pair (D, d) where d ∈ D ⊂ R2, D
is closed and bounded above (i.e. for all x ∈ D the set {y ∈ D : y ≥ x}
is compact). D is the set of feasible utility pairs, and d is the disagreement
point.
The Pareto frontier ofD is the set ∂D := {x ∈ D : ({x}+R2+)∩D = {x}}.
We denote as B2 the set of two-person bargaining problems. Given Bˆ2 ⊆
B2, a bargaining solution on Bˆ2 is a map ψ : Bˆ2 → R2 such that for each
(D, d) ∈ Bˆ2, ψ(D, d) ∈ D and ψ(D, d) ≥ d, where ψ(D, d) represents the
expected final payoff for the players when facing the bargaining problem
(D, d). The most well-known solution on bargaining problems is the Nash
solution (Nash, 1950). Let gd(x) = (x1 − d1)(x2 − d2) for each x ∈ R2. Let
BN2 ⊂ B2 be the set of all two-person bargaining problems (D, d) such that
gd reaches a unique maximizer over D. This unique maximizer determines
the Nash solution.
We define a land rental problem as a tuple (N0, c, r, µ) with N0 = {0}∪N
where 0 is a single tenant and N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of lessors, c ∈ RN+
represents the amount of available land for each lessor, and r ∈ R+ represents
the reservation price per unit of land for each lessor, and µ : R+ −→ R is a
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function that assigns to each amount of land the tenant’s revenue when that
amount is rented. For simplicity, we assume that there exist K,E > 0 such
that
µ(x) =
{
K if x ≥ E
0 if x < E
(1)
for all x ≥ 0. Hence, K is the utility that the tenant obtains by having at
least E units of land, and otherwise the tenant obtains nothing. In Section
6 we loose assumption (1) and study a more general, continuous function
µ. Under assumption (1), we write (N, c, r,K,E) instead of (N0, c, r, µ).
All c, r,K and E are common knowledge among the agents. In order for
cooperation to be profitable, we assume that E ≤ c(N), and there exists
y ∈ RN+ , y ≤ c, y(N) = E, such that rE ≤ K.
The set of admissible agreements is given by:
A =
{
(p, x) : p, x ∈ RN+ , x ≤ c
}
.
Given (p, x) ∈ A, the utility for the tenant and each lessor i ∈ N are,
respectively,
u0(p, x) =
{
K −∑i∈N pixi, if E ≤ x(N)
0, otherwise,
and
ui(p, x) =
{
(pi − r)xi, if E ≤ x(N)
0, otherwise.
We now formalize the general sequential bargaining protocol. Given a land
rental problem (N0, c, r,K,E) and ρ ∈ [0, 1[, the tenant bargains sequentially
in n stages, one for each lessor, following the non-cooperative game described
by Herrero (1989) with the first proposer randomly chosen2. Namely, with
probability 1
2
, the tenant (lessor) makes a proposal which is made definitive
if the lessor (tenant) agrees with it. In case the lessor (tenant) disagrees,
with a probability ρ the roles change and the lessor (tenant) becomes new
2Our results do not change if we use any other criterion for choosing the first proposer,
as for example make always the lessor be first proposer.
7
proposer, so that the process is repeated; and with a probability 1− ρ there
is disagreement and both players go to next stage. Hence, negotiations in
each stage are bilateral between tenant and lessor in that stage. Without loss
of generality, we consider that the ordering is 1, 2, . . . , n. For each i ∈ N ,
we use the notation ai = (pi, xi) ∈ R+ × [0, ci] to represent the agreement
reached by the tenant and lessor i, so that pi is the price per unit of land
and xi is the amount of rented land.
The tenant and lessor s bargain in stage s. For each lessor s ∈ N ,
As = {((pi, xi))si=1 : pi ≥ 0, xi ∈ [0, ci] ∀ i}
is the set of feasible agreements which the tenant and lessor 1, 2, . . . , s can
propose, and
Aˆ =
{
((pi, xi))i∈N ∈ A : pi = pˆ ∈ R+ ∀ i ∈ N
}
is the set of feasible agreements in which the price is equal for all lessors.
In particular, An = A. For notational convenience we denote A0 = {∅}.
We begin by characterizing the final payoff allocation for the simplest case
in which there exists a unique lessor (hereinafter called 1-lessor land renting
problem). In this case, we assume w.l.o.g. N = {1}. Clearly, protocols with
uniform price and non-uniform price coincide when there is a single lessor.
Proposition 2.1 shows the result for both protocols:
Proposition 2.1 Given a 1-lessor land renting problem (N0, c, r,K,E), the
final payoff allocation approaches
(
K−rE
2
, K−rE
2
)
as ρ→ 1.
Proof. The tenant and lessor 1 face a bargaining problem (D, d) with d =
(0, 0) and
D = {(u0(a), u1(a)) : a ∈ A}
= {(K − p1x1, (p1 − r)x1) : p1 ≥ 0, x1 ∈ [E, c1]} ∪ {(0, 0)}.
Since E ≤ c1, it is straightforward to check that the Pareto frontier of D is:
∂D = {(K − p1E, (p1 − r)E) : p1 ≥ 0}
= {(u0, u1) : u1 + u0 = K − rE, u0 ≤ K} .
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The Nash solution is
(
K−rE
2
, K−rE
2
)
and, following Herrero (1989), it is also
the unique final equilibrium payoff allocation as ρ→ 1.
For more than one lessor, the final payoff allocation depends on the pro-
tocol.
2.1 Protocol with non-uniform price
We describe the negotiation process of the non-cooperative protocol with
non-uniform price inductively as follows:
Stage 1: With probability 1
2
, the tenant is chosen as first proposer and
lessor 1 as first responder. With probability 1
2
, lessor 1 is chosen as first
proposer and the tenant as first responder. Both proceed by an indeterminate
number of rounds:
At rounds 1, 3, 5, · · · , 2t+1, the first proposer offers a pair a1 ∈ R+×[0, c1].
If the first responder agrees, we move to stage 2 with a1 as agreement between
the tenant and lessor 1. If the first responder rejects, with probability ρ we
move to next round, and with probability 1 − ρ we move to stage 2 with
a1 = (0, 0) as agreement between the tenant and lessor 1.
At rounds 2, 4, 6, · · · , 2t + 2, the first responder offers a pair a1 ∈ R+ ×
[0, c1]. If the first proposer agrees, we move to stage 2 with a1 as agreement
between the tenant and lessor 1. If the first proposer rejects, with probability
ρ we move to next round, and with probability 1−ρ we move to stage 2 with
a1 = (0, 0) as agreement between the tenant and lessor 1.
Stage s: Knowing (ai)
s−1
i=1 ∈ As−1, the tenant and lessor s agree on a pair
as ∈ R+× [0, cs] following the same protocol with rounds as the one described
in Stage 1, now between the tenant and lessor 2. In case of disagreement,
as = (0, 0).
Since ρ < 1, we finish stage s with probability 1, and we obtain an element
in As. After finishing Stage n (again, ρ < 1 implies that this happens with
probability 1), we obtain an element in A.
We now describe the corresponding two-person bargaining problem in
each stage. We proceed backwards from Stage n to Stage 1.
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Stage n: (ai)
n−1
i=1 ∈ An−1 represents the agreements reached in the previous
stages. The tenant and lessor n should agree on a pair an = (pn, xn), so that
the final agreement is an =
(
(ai)
n−1
i=1 , an
) ∈ A. Hence, the tenant and lessor
n face the two-person bargaining problem (Dn, dn) with
Dn = {(u0(an), un(an)) : pn ≥ 0, xn ∈ [0, cn]}
and
dn =
(
u0(a
n,0), un(a
n,0)
)
where an,0 =
(
(ai)
n−1
i=1 , a
0
n
) ∈ A with a0n = (0, 0). It is clear that Dn is
nonempty, closed and bounded above, and dn ∈ Dn.
Let a∗n = (p
∗
n, x
∗
n) be a pair that determines a Nash solution in (D
n, dn).
We define α∗n : An−1 → A as α∗n ((ai)n−1i=1 ) = ((ai)n−1i=1 , a∗n).
Assume that we have defined α∗s+1 : As → A for any s < n.
Stage s: (ai)
s−1
i=1 ∈ As−1 represents the agreements reached at the previous
stages. The tenant and lessor s should agree on a pair as = (ps, xs), so that
the final agreement is as = α∗s+1
(
(ai)
s−1
i=1 , as
) ∈ A. Hence, they face the
two-person bargaining problem (Ds, ds) with
Ds = {(u0(as), us(as)) : ps ≥ 0, xs ∈ [0, cs]}
and
ds =
(
u0(a
s,0), us(a
s,0)
)
where as,0 = α∗s+1
(
(ai)
s−1
i=1 , a
0
s
) ∈ A with a0s = (0, 0). Notice that we do not
identify disagreement points with outside option points, but with the equi-
librium payoff allocation that arises after disagreement (or, more specifically,
after breakdown in one of the rounds).
Let a∗s = (p
∗
s, x
∗
s) be a pair that determines a Nash solution in (D
s, ds).
We define α∗s : As−1 → A as
α∗s
(
(ai)
s−1
i=1
)
= α∗s+1
(
(ai)
s−1
i=1 , a
∗
s
)
.
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The final agreement is given by α∗1(∅) ∈ A.
2.2 Protocol with uniform price
The negotiation process of the non-cooperative protocol with uniform price is
analogous to the process with non-uniform price. The only difference is that
the final price is updated after the last stage, at the highest price reached
upon, i.e. pmax = maxi∈N{pi} for all lessors.
We now describe the corresponding two-person bargaining problem in
each stage. We proceed backwards from Stage n to Stage 1.
Stage n: (ai)
n−1
i=1 ∈ An−1 represents the agreements reached in the previous
stages. The tenant and lessor n should agree on a pair an = (pn, xn). For
such an, we define aˆ
n
i = (pˆ
n
i , xˆ
n
i ) with pˆ
n
i = p
max and xˆni = xi for all i ∈ N .
We define the updated agreement of (ai)
n
i=1 as aˆ
n = (aˆni )
n
i=1 ∈ Aˆ. Hence, the
tenant and lessor n face the two-person bargaining problem (Dˆn, dˆn) with
Dˆn = {(u0(aˆn), un(aˆn)) : pn ≥ 0, xn ∈ [0, cn]}
and
dˆn =
(
u0(aˆ
n,0), un(aˆ
n,0)
)
where aˆn,0 ∈ Aˆ is the updated agreement of ((ai)n−1i=1 , a0n) with a0n = (0, 0).
Let a∗n = (p
∗
n, x
∗
n) be a pair that determines a Nash solution in (Dˆ
n, dˆn).
We define αˆ∗n : An−1 → Aˆ as αˆ∗n ((ai)n−1i=1 ) = aˆ∗n where aˆ∗n is the updated
agreement of
(
(ani )
n−1
i=1 , a
∗
n
)
.
Assume that we have defined αˆ∗s+1 : As → Aˆ for s < n.
Stage s: (ai)
s−1
i=1 ∈ As−1 represents the agreements reached in the previous
stages. The tenant and lessor s should agree on a pair as = (ps, xs). The
updated agreement of (ai)
s
i=1 is aˆ
s = αˆ∗s+1
(
(ai)
s−1
i=1 , as
) ∈ Aˆ. Hence, the
tenant and lessor s face the two-person bargaining problem (Dˆs, dˆs) with
Dˆs = {(u0(aˆs), us(aˆs)) : ps ≥ 0, xs ∈ [0, cs]}
and
dˆs =
(
u0(aˆ
s,0), us(aˆ
s,0)
)
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where aˆs,0 ∈ Aˆ is the updated agreement of ((ai)s−1i=1 , a0s) with a0s = (0, 0).
Again, we do not identify disagreement points with outside option points, but
with the equilibrium payoff allocation that arises after disagreement (break-
down). Let a∗s = (p
∗
s, x
∗
s) be a pair that determines a Nash solution in
(Dˆs, dˆs). We define αˆ∗s : As−1 → Aˆ as
αˆ∗s
(
(ai)
s−1
i=1
)
= αˆ∗s+1
(
(ai)
s−1
i=1 , a
∗
s
)
.
The final agreement is given by αˆ∗1(∅) ∈ Aˆ.
3 An illustration with two lessors
In order to illustrate the sequential bargaining protocol, we consider the
land rental problem (N0, c, r,K,E) with N = {1, 2} and c1, c2 < E. For each
i ∈ N we use the notation (pi, xi) ∈ R+ × [0, ci] to represent the agreement
between the tenant and lessor i, so that pi is the price per unit of land and
xi is the amount of rented land.
Since there are two lessors, the protocol has two stages:
Stage 1: The tenant and the first lessor in the order (lessor 1) agree on a
pair (p1, x1) ∈ R+ × [0, c1]. In case of disagreement, we assume p1 = 0 and
x1 = 0.
Stage 2: The tenant and the second lessor in the order (lessor 2) agree
on a pair (p2, x2) ∈ R+ × [0, c2]. In case of disagreement, we assume p2 = 0
and x2 = 0.
After Stage 2, we have (p, x) ∈ A.
In the non-uniform price case, this is the final agreement, so the final
payoff allocation is (u0(p, x), u1(p, x), u2(p, x)). For the uniform price case,
the final agreement is (pˆ, x) ∈ A with pˆi = max{p1, p2} for all i ∈ N , so the
final payoff allocation is (u0 (pˆ, x) , u1 (pˆ, x) , u2 (pˆ, x)).
Notice that, in this land rental problem, the tenant needs to reach an
agreement with both lessor 1 (because c2 < E) and lessor 2 (because c1 < E).
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Example 3.1 Let (N0, c, r,K,E) be a land rental problem with N = {1, 2},
c = (9, 9), r = 2, K = 250 and E = 10. Assume that, in Stage 1, the tenant
and lessor 1 agree on p1 = 12 and x1 = 4. Assume also that, in Stage 2,
the tenant and lessor 2 agree on p2 = 10 and x2 = 6. Then, in the non-
uniform price case, the final payoffs are u0 ((12, 10), (4, 6)) = 250− (12 · 4 +
10 · 6) = 142 for tenant, u1 ((12, 10), (4, 6)) = (12 − 2)4 = 40 for lessor 1,
and u2 ((12, 10), (4, 6)) = (10 − 2)6 = 48 for lessor 2. Thus, the final payoff
allocation is (142, 40, 48). In the uniform price case, the final payoffs are
u0 ((12, 12), (4, 6)) = 250−12 · (4+6) = 130 for tenant, u1 ((12, 12), (4, 6)) =
(12 − 2)4 = 40 for lessor 1, and u2 ((12, 10), (4, 6)) = (12 − 2)6 = 60 for
lessor 2. Thus, the final payoff allocation is (130, 40, 60).
Assume now that the tenant and lessor 1 reach the same agreement as
before but, in Stage 2, the tenant and lessor 2 do not reach an agreement.
Then, p2 = x2 = 0 and the final payoff allocation is (0, 0, 0) in both cases.
Intuitively, it seems natural that reaching a Pareto efficient agreement in
the last stage will imply an efficient final payoff allocation, i.e. x1 + x2 = E
should hold. This is the case for the protocol with non-uniform price, but
not always for the protocol with uniform price, as we can see in Example 3.2.
Example 3.2 Consider the land rental problem in Example 3.1. Assume
that, in Stage 1, the tenant and lessor 1 agree on p1 = 2 and x1 = 9 and,
in Stage 2, the tenant and lessor 2 agree on p2 = 20. The final agreement
is efficient iff x2 = 1. However, x2 = 1 yields a Pareto inefficient payoff
allocation in Stage 2 for the tenant and lessor 2. When x2 = 1, their final
payoffs are, respectively, 50 and 18. If they agreed instead on p′2 = 15 and
x′2 = 2, then their final payoffs would be, respectively, 85 and 26. The tenant
and lessor 2 are both better off but there is an inefficiency because x1+x
′
2 > E.
Intuitively, the inefficiency in the previous example arises because the
first lessor in the order will have in the second stage no further chance to
renegotiate its agreement in the first stage. Since the tenant cannot decrease
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the price for lessor 2 in the second stage, it makes it optimal to buy more land
than needed (hence the inefficiency) in order to get a balanced (as prescribed
by the Nash solution) agreement between the tenant and lessor 2.
We now describe the corresponding two-person bargaining problem in
each stage according to the protocol with non-uniform price and uniform
price respectively.
3.1 Protocol with non-uniform price
In Stage 1, the tenant and lessor 1 agree on either a pair (p1, x1) ∈ R+×[0, c1],
or, in case of disagreement, p1 = 0 and x1 = 0. In order to know the final
payoff, they need to anticipate what will happen in Stage 2, where the tenant
and lessor 2 bargain. In order to guarantee that the agreement can be possible
in Stage 2, it is necessary that
x1 ≥ E − c2 (2)
(otherwise, the tenant would not be able to get E), and
(p1 − r)x1 ≤ K − rE (3)
(otherwise, the tenant and lessor 2 would not have benefit of cooperation).
Henceforth, (2) and (3) are strategic constraints.
In Stage 2, the tenant and lessor 2, knowing (p1, x1), agree on a pair
(p2, x2) ∈ R+ × [0, c2]. In case of disagreement, p2 = 0 and x2 = 0. We con-
sider the land rental problem in Example 3.1. Then, for each possible choice
(p1, x1), both the tenant and lessor 2 face a bargaining problem (D
2, d2) with
D2 = D2 (p1, x1) = {(u0(p, x), u2(p, x)) : p2 ≥ 0, x2 ∈ [0, 9]}
and d2 = (0, 0). Recall that p1 and x1 are uniform (they come from Stage 1).
A Pareto efficient agreement is obtained if and only if x2 = 10 − x1. Then,
we have that
∂D2 = {(250− p1x1 − p2(10− x1), (p2 − 2)(10− x2)) : p2 ≥ 0}
= {(u0, u2) : u0 + u2 ≤ 230− (p1 − 2) x1, u0 ≤ 250− p1x1} .
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The Nash bargaining solution gives both agents the same utility u0 = u2 =
230−(p1−2)x1
2
, which are uniquely determined by p∗2 = p
∗
2(p1, x1) =
250−p1x1
2(10−x1) + 1
and x∗2 = x
∗
2(p1, x1) = 10 − x1. We can see illustrations of three possible
choices of (p1, x1) and its corresponding D
2 in Figure 1.
Given this, we now can go back to Stage 1 when the tenant and lessor
1 can anticipate the final payoff for each possible choice of (p1, x1). The
bargaining problem (D1, d1) is given by
D1 = {(u0 (p, x) , u1 (p, x)) : p2 = p∗2, x2 = x∗2, p1 ≥ 0, x1 ∈ [0, 9]}
and d1 = (0, 0).
Assuming (2) and (3), we have u0(p, x) = 250 − p1x1 − p∗2 · (10 − x1) =
230−(p1−2)x1
2
and u1(p, x) = (p1 − 2)x1. Hence, we can rewrite D1 as:
D∗1 =
{(
230− (p1 − 2)x1
2
, (p1 − 2)x1
)
: (p1, x1) ∈ ∆1 ∪ {(0, 0)}
}
where
∆1 = {(p1, x1) ∈ R+ × [0, 9] : x1 ≥ 1, (p1 − 2)x1 ≤ 230}
is the set of partial agreements that satisfy (2) and (3). Clearly ∂D∗1 =
∂D1 and hence the Nash solution coincides in both (D1, d1) and (D∗1, d1).
In particular, the Nash solution maximizes
(
230−(p1−2)x1
2
)
(p1 − 2)x1. This
maximum is reached when (p1− 2)x1 = 115. See Figure 2 for the illustration
of ∂D1 and the Nash solution for (p1 − 2)x1 = 115. Then, the final payoff
allocation is (57.5, 115, 57.5).
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p1
x1
E − c2 = 1
0
c1 = 9
r = 2 K
E
= 25
S
M
L
115 230
0
115
230
u0
u2
D2(S)D2(M)
D2(L)
Figure 1: The bargaining problem with non-uniform price that arises in
Stage 2. Left: Three possible choices of (p1, x1) in Stage 1 subject to feasible
(p1 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x1 ≤ c1) and strategic (p1 ≥ r, x1 ≥ E−c2 and (p1 − r) x1 ≤
K − rE) constraints. Right: Examples of D2, with their respective Nash
solutions, for each choice (p1, x1): D
2(S) when (p1 − r)x1 = 0, D2(M) when
(p1 − r)x1 = K−rE2 , and D2(L) when (p1 − r)x1 = K − rE. Equation
u0 + u2 = K − rE − (p1 − r)x1 determines the Pareto frontier of each D2.
Hence, the smaller (p1 − r)x1, the better the tenant and lessor 2 are.
57.5 115 230
0
115
230
u0
u1
∂D1
Figure 2: ∂D1 with its Nash solution for the bargaining problem with non-
uniform price that arises in Stage 1.
3.2 Protocol with uniform price
In Stage 1, the tenant and lessor 1 agree on either a pair (p1, x1) ∈ R+×[0, c1],
or, in case of disagreement, p1 = 0 and x1 = 0. In order to know the final
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payoff, they need to anticipate what will happen in Stage 2, where the tenant
and lessor 2 bargain. In order to guarantee that the agreement can be possible
in Stage 2, it is necessary that (2) holds (otherwise, the tenant would not be
able to get E), and
p1 ≤ K
E
(4)
(otherwise, the tenant and lessor 2 would not have benefit of cooperation).
Henceforth, (2) and (4) are strategic constraints.
In Stage 2, the tenant and lessor 2, knowing (p1, x1), agree on a pair
(p2, x2) ∈ R+ × [0, c2]. In case of disagreement, p2 = 0 and x2 = 0. We
also consider the same land rental problem in Example 3.1. Then, for each
possible (p1, x1), both the tenant and lessor 2 face a bargaining problem
(Dˆ2, dˆ2) with
Dˆ2 = Dˆ2(p1, x1) = {(u0 (pˆ, x) , u2 (pˆ, x)) : p2 ≥ 0, x2 ∈ [0, 9]}
and dˆ2 = (0, 0). Recall pˆ1 = pˆ2 = max{p1, p2}. As opposed to the protocol
with non-uniform price, inefficiency can arise when x2 = 10− x1, as we can
see in Example 3.2.
It is straightforward to check that ∂Dˆ2 can be written as:
∂Dˆ2 =
{
(u0 (p2, x2) , g2 (u0 (p2, x2))) : (p2, x2) ∈ ∆ˆ2
}
where
∆ˆ2 = [p1,∞[× [10− x1, 9]
and
g2(u0) = max
{(
250− u0
x1 + x2
− r
)
x2 : x2 ∈
[
10− x1,min
{
9,
250− u0
p1
− x1
}]}
,
for all u0 ∈] − ∞, 10p1]. By maximizing
(
250−u0
x1+x2
− r
)
x2, we obtain x
∗
2 =√
x1
2
(250− u0)−x1 and p∗2 =
√
2(250−u0)
x1
. We have to distinguish three cases
depending on whether x∗2 is so small that (together with x1) it does not suffice
to reach E, it is so large that either exceeds c2 or (given price p1) the tenant
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cannot afford to buy it, or it is neither too small nor too large. These cases
are the following: x∗2 < 10− x1, 10− x1 ≤ x∗2 < q, and q ≤ x∗2, where
q = min
{
9,
250− u0
p1
− x1
}
.
These cases can be simplified as follows:3
• First case (small p1x1): p1x1 < 20.
• Second case (medium p1x1): 20 ≤ p1x1 < (x1 + 9) · 2.
• Third case (large p1x1): p1x1 ≥ (x1 + 9) · 2.
We can see illustrations of three possible choices of (p1, x1) and its corre-
sponding Dˆ2 in Figure 3.
In Stage 1, the tenant and lessor 1 face a bargaining problem (Dˆ1, dˆ1)
with dˆ1 = (0, 0) given as
Dˆ1 = {(u0 (pˆ, x) , u1 (pˆ, x)) : p2 = p∗2, x2 = x∗2, p2 ≥ p1, x1 ∈ [0, 9]} .
Assuming (2) and (4), we have u0(pˆ, x) = 250−(x1+x∗2)p∗2 and u1(pˆ, x) =
(p∗2 − r)x1. Hence, we can rewrite Dˆ1 as:
Dˆ∗1 =
{
(250− (x1 + x∗2)p∗2, (p∗2 − 2)x1) : (p1, x1) ∈ ∆ˆ1 ∪ {(0, 0)}
}
.
where
∆ˆ1 = [0, 25]× [1, 9]
is the set of partial agreements that satisfy (2) and (4). Clearly ∂Dˆ∗1 = ∂Dˆ1,
and hence the Nash solution coincide in both
(
Dˆ1, dˆ1
)
and
(
Dˆ∗1, dˆ1
)
. In
particular, the Nash solution maximizes u∗0(p1, x1)u
∗
1(p1, x1).The final payoff
allocation is (107, 53.5, 53.5). This payoff allocation is inefficient, i.e. u0 +
u1 + u2 < K − rE. We can see the illustration of ∂Dˆ1 in Figure 3. Notice
that the Dˆ1 is not convex.
3General computations are given in the proof of Theorem 5.2 (Section 5).
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p1
x1
E − c2 = 1
K
E
= 25
0
r = 2
c1 = 9
S
M L
107 230
0
107
230
u0
u2
Dˆ 2
(S)
Dˆ 2
(M
)
Dˆ 2
(L
)
Figure 3: The bargaining problem with uniform price that arises in Stage
2. Left: Three Possible choices of (p1, x1) in Stage 1 subject to feasible
(p1 > 0 and 0 ≤ x1 ≤ c1) and strategic (x1 ≥ E − c2 and r ≤ p1 ≤ KE )
constraints, e.g. S with (p1, x1) = (2, 5.5), M with (p1x1) = (3.5, 8) and L
with (p1x1) = (14, 8.5). Right: Examples of Dˆ
2, with their respective Nash
solutions, for each possible choice (p1, x1): Dˆ
2(S) with p1x1 < rE, Dˆ
2(M)
with rE ≤ p1x1 < (x1 + c2)r, and Dˆ2(L) with p1x1 ≥ (x1 + c2)r.
107 230
53.5
107
u0
u1
∂Dˆ1
0
Figure 4: ∂Dˆ1 with Nash solution for the bargaining problem with uniform
price that arises in Stage 1.
4 The unanimity case
Let (N0, c, r,K,E) be a land rental problem. We consider that the tenant
needs all available land, i.e. E = c(N), which implies that all lessors are
necessary. In this context, an efficient agreement implies xi = ci for all
i ∈ N .
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Theorem 4.1 presents a result in case we consider a non-uniform price.
Theorem 4.1 Given a land rental problem (N0, c, r,K,E) with E = c(N),
the final payoff allocation according to the protocol with non-uniform price
approaches (
K − rE
2n
,
K − rE
2
,
K − rE
22
, . . . ,
K − rE
2n
)
as ρ approaches 1.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is located in the Appendix.
As it can be seen in Theorem 4.1, there is a highly unequal division of
surplus in the non-uniform price case. The intuition is the following: The
first players in the order have no further chance to renegotiate their position.
This gives them a huge bargaining advantage, because their proposals are
more of the kind take-or-leave offers. Once some land is already rented by
the lessor, this advantage decreases in the order.
Theorem 4.2 presents a result in case we consider a uniform price.
Theorem 4.2 Given a land rental problem (N0, c, r,K,E) with E = c(N),
the final payoff allocation according to the protocol with uniform price ap-
proaches: (
K − rE
2
,
K − rE
2E
c1, . . . ,
K − rE
2E
cn
)
as ρ approaches 1.
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is located in the Appendix.
We can now give a first answer to the question of what is the best pro-
tocol for the tenant. When there are more than one lessor and all the land
is necessary (E = c(N)), then the tenant strictly prefers a protocol with
uniform price, as stated in in Corollary 4.1.
Corollary 4.1 Given a land rental problem (N0, c, r,K,E) with n > 1 and
E = c(N), the utility of the tenant with uniform price is higher than with
non-uniform price.
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Proof. By Theorem 4.2 according to the protocol with uniform price the
utility of the tenant is K−rE
2
, and by Theorem 4.1 according to the protocol
with non-uniform price the utility of the tenant is K−rE
2n
. Since K > rE and
n > 1, we deduce K−rE
2
> K−rE
2n
.
We can also give an answer to the question of whether it is profitable
for the lessors to merge. Merging of lessors is unprofitable under protocol
with non-uniform price. However, merging is irrelevant under protocol with
uniform price, as stated in Corollary 4.2.
Corollary 4.2 Given a land rental problem (N0, c, r,K,E) with n > 1 and
E = c(N), under the protocol with non-uniform price, the utility of the lessors
when they merge is less than their aggregate utility. Under the protocol with
uniform price, merging of lessors is irrelevant.
Proof. Under the protocol with non-uniform price: by Theorem 4.1, the sum
of the utilities of the lessors can be computed as K − rE − u0 = K − rE −
K−rE
2n
= (2
n−1)(K−rE)
2n
. By Proposition 2.1, the utility of the unique lessor is
K−rE
2
. Since n > 1, it is straightforward to check that K−rE
2
<
(2n−1)(K−rE)
2n
.
Under the protocol with uniform price: by Theorem 4.2, the sum of
utilities of the lessors is K−rE
2
, which coincide with the utility when they
merge (by Proposition 2.1). Hence, merging of the lessors is irrelevant.
5 The two-lessors case
In Section 4, we consider that all available land is necessary. In this section,
we study the general case, focusing on the case of a land rental problem with
two lessors (hereinafter called 2-lessor land renting problem). In this case, we
assume w.l.o.g. N = {1, 2}. In general, both protocols (non-uniform price
and uniform price) yield the same final payoff allocation when at least one of
the lessors i ∈ N has enough land to cover the needs of the the tenant (i.e.
E ≤ ci). However, results critically change when both lessors are necessary.
Theorem 5.1 characterizes the final payoff allocation in the protocol with
non-uniform price for 2-lessor land rental problems.
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Theorem 5.1 In a 2-lessor land renting problem (N0, c, r,K,E), the final
payoff allocation of the protocol with non-uniform price is given by:
u∗ =


(
3K−rE
4
, K−rE
4
, 0
)
if E ≤ c1, c2(
K−rE
2
, K−rE
2
, 0
)
if c2 < E ≤ c1(
K−rE
2
, 0, K−rE
2
)
if c1 < E ≤ c2(
K−rE
4
, K−rE
2
, K−rE
4
)
if E > c1, c2
for ρ→ 1.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is located in the Appendix, and we just describe
here intuitively the proof for the case E ≤ c1, c2. The disagreement point
between player 0 (the tenant) and player 1 (lessor 1) in stage 1 is d1 =(
K−rE
2
, 0
)
because player 0 (the tenant) after disagreement in stage 1 expects
to obtain K−rE
2
in the subgame that begins in stage 2. The disagreement
point in this (out of equilibrium) stage 2 is indeed d2 = (0, 0) because there
are no other chances to get land. Hence, in stage 1 the Nash bargaining
solution is
(
3K−rE
4
, K−rE
4
)
, whereas in stage 2 the disagreement point in
equilibrium
(
3K−rE
4
, 0
)
is Pareto optimal and hence the result.
Theorem 5.2 shows the final payoff allocation in the protocol with uniform
price for 2-lessor land rental problem.
Theorem 5.2 In a 2-lessor land renting problem (N0, c, r,K,E) the final
payoff allocation of the bargaining protocol with uniform price, for ρ→ 1, is:
u∗ =


(
3K−rE
4
, K−rE
4
, 0
)
if E ≤ c1, c2(
K−rE
2
, K−rE
2
, 0
)
if c2 < E ≤ c1(
K−rE
2
, 0, K−rE
2
)
if c1 < E ≤ c2,
and when c1, c2 < E and K is large enough (K >
(c1+2c2)(c1+c2)
E−c2 r), the final
payoff allocation is given by:(
K − (c1 + c2) r
2
,
c1K
2 (c1 + c2)
− c1r
2
,
c2K
2 (c1 + c2)
− c2r
2
)
.
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The proof of Theorem 5.2 is located in the Appendix.
In general this result does not hold for K < E+c2
E−c2 rE when c1, c2 < E. In
Example 3.1 for protocol with uniform price, we obtain an inefficient payoff
allocation because condition K > E+c2
E−c2 rE is not satisfied.
The tenant prefers to negotiate according to the protocol with uniform
price, as stated in Corollary 5.1.
Corollary 5.1 Let (N0, c, r,K,E) be a 2-lessor land renting problem with K
large enough
(
K > E+c2
E−c2 rE
)
. Then, the tenant is indifferent to negotiate ac-
cording to protocol with non-uniform price or to protocol with uniform price,
unless E > c1, c2, where the tenant strictly prefers to negotiate according to
protocol with uniform price.
Proof. By Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2, the utility of the tenant is equal
in both protocols with non-uniform and uniform price, unless E > c1, c2.
We now prove that when E > c1, c2 and K >
E+c2
E−c2 rE, the utility of
the tenant according to protocol with uniform price (K−(c1+c2)r
2
by Theorem
5.2) is strictly higher than with the protocol with non-uniform price (K−rE
4
by
Theorem 5.1), i.e. K−(c1+c2)r
2
> K−rE
4
, or, equivalently, K > (2(c1+c2)−E)r.
Since K > E+c2
E−c2 rE, it is enough to check that
E+c2
E−c2 rE > (2(c1 + c2) − E)r.
This is equivalent to
E2 > (E − c2)(c1 + c2).
Since E > c1, c2 > 0 and c1 + c2 ≥ E,
E2 > E2 − c22 = (E − c2)(E + c2) > (E − c2)(c1 + c2).
In this case, we cannot give a definitive answer to the question of whether
it is profitable for the lessors to merge, since it would depend on both the
protocol and the amount of available land of each lessor, as next Corollary
shows.
Corollary 5.2 Let (N0, c, r,K,E) be a 2-lessor land renting problem. Under
the protocol with uniform price with K large enough
(
K > E+c2
E−c2 rE
)
, the
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utility of the lessors (weakly) increases when they merge. Under the protocol
with non-uniform price, the utility of the lessors also (weakly) increases when
they merge, except in case E > c1, c2 where merging is unfavorable for lessors.
Proof. We prove first the case with non-uniform price. When c2 < E ≤ c1
or c1 < E ≤ c2, by Theorem 5.1, the sum of utilities of the lessors is K−rE2 ,
and by Proposition 2.1, the utility for the unique lessor (when they merge)
is K−rE
2
. Then, the utilities are equal in both cases. When E ≤ c1, c2, by
Theorem 5.1, the sum of utilities of the lessors is K−rE
4
, and by Proposition
2.1, the utility of the unique lessor is K−rE
2
. Then, merging is profitable
for lessors. On the contrary, when E > c1, c2, by Theorem 5.1, the sum of
utilities of the lessors is 3(K−rE)
4
, and by Proposition 2.1, the utility of the
unique lessor is K−rE
2
. Then, merging is unprofitable for lessors.
We prove now the case with uniform price with K > E+c2
E−c2 rE. When
c2 < E ≤ c1, c1 < E ≤ c2, or E ≤ c1, c2, the proof is analogous to the
protocol with non-uniform price using Theorem 5.2 instead of Theorem 5.1.
Now, we focus on the case E > c1, c2. By Theorem 5.2, the sum of utilities
of the lessors is K−(c1+c2)r
2
, and by Proposition 2.1, the utility of the unique
lessor is K−rE
2
. Then, since E < c1 + c2, it is straightforward to check that
K−(c1+c2)r
2
< k−rE
2
.
6 The two-lessors case with a continuous µ
In the previous sections we have assumed a very extreme discrete benefit
function µ. In this section we analyze a continuous version of this function.
In particular, we assume
µ(x) = µl(x) = α ·
(
1− β−xl
)
(5)
for some α > 0, β > 1, l > 0, and all x ≥ 0. Since we assume that there
always exists benefit of cooperation, there should be some x ∈]0, c(N)] such
that µ(x) > rx.
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The function given by (5) is continuous and, for each pair K,E > 0 and
l > 1, it is possible to find a unique pair α > 0, β > 1 such that K,E
represent the maximum benefit and the amount of land required to get it,
respectively. Moreover, this function generalizes µ given in (1) in the sense
that, fixing K and E, µl converges pointwise to µ, i.e. for all x ≥ 0, µl(x)
approaches µ(x) as l increases. Formally:
Proposition 6.1 For any K,E > 0 and l > 1, there exist a unique α > 0
and a unique β > 1 such that µl(E) = K and
µl(E)− rE = max
x∈[0,c(N)]
{
µl(x)− rx}
where µl is defined as in (5). Moreover, for each x ≥ 0,
lim
l→∞
µl(x) = µ(x)
where µ is defined as in (1).
Proof. Fix K,E, l. We have
∂
∂x
µl(x) = αlxl−1β−x
l
ln β
which implies that µl is a strictly increasing function. Moreover,
∂2
∂x2
µl(x) = αl · (l − 1− lxl ln β) xl−2β−xl ln β
which implies that µl is strictly convex for x < x(0) =
(
l−1
l lnβ
) 1
l
and strictly
concave for x > x(0). Since
lim
x→∞
µl(x) = α
we deduce that there exists exactly one x(1) = x(1)(α, β, l) > x(0) such that
∂
∂x
µl(x(1)) = r and, moreover, x(2) = min{c(N), x(1)} is the only value that
satisfies µl
(
x(2)
)− rx(2) = maxx∈[0,c(N)]{µl(x)− rx} (see Figure 5).
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x0 x(0) x(1)
µl(x)
α µl
slope r
Figure 5: Visual proof that there exists a unique x(1) that maximizes µl(x)−
rx.
It is clear that x(1) decreases with β, so that we can find a unique β such
that x(2) = E. Analogously, µl(x) increases with α, so that we can find a
unique α such that µl
(
x(2)
)
= K. On the other hand, x(1) increases with l, so
that (once E and K are fixed) an increase of l also increases β and decreases
α. Hence, for each x ∈ [0, E[, there exists some l(x) such that, for all l > l(x),
µl(x) < x(0), which implies liml→∞ µl(x) = 0 = µ(x). Analogously, for each
x ≥ E, there exists some l(x) such that, for all l > l(x), µl(x) < x(0), which
implies liml→∞ µl(x) = K = µ(x).
As l increases, µl approaches µ given in (1). An example can be seen in
Figure 6
x0
µl(x)
E
K
µ1
µ2
µ4 µ
8 µ16
Figure 6: Example of functions µl that approach µ given in (1) as l increases.
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Notice that proof of Proposition 6.1 is not constructive. Given K,E, we
know the unique existence of α and β from each l, but not a direct way to
obtain them. We can, however, get an approximation of α, β by solving the
implicit equation system
K = α ·
(
1− β−El
)
r = αlEl−1β−E
l
ln β.
Proposition 6.1 assures that this system has unique solutions α, β for each
K,E, r, l. By using a brute force algorithm (Algorithm 1 in the Appendix),
we compute these parameters for some possible values of l. In next table,
we represent the utilities for some possible values of l in the protocol with
non-uniform price, where the last column is given by Theorem 5.1:
l = 1 l = 2 l = 4 l = 8 l = 16 l =∞
α 255.1 252.1 250.9 250.4 250.3 -
β − 1 0.4784 0.0491 5.6 · 10−4 6.5 · 10−8 6.7 · 10−16 -
u∗0 172.4 172.1 171.0 166.1 137.4 57.5
u∗1 57.4 57.4 57.4 57.4 57.4 115.0
u∗2 0.2 0.5 1.6 6.5 35.2 57.5
As it can be checked from the table, for the non-uniform case, the tenant is
able to extract a much higher surplus under the continuous benefit function.
7 Concluding remarks
We propose two sequential bargaining protocols between a single tenant and
several lessors and study their equilibria. These protocols differ on the price
per unit of land (lessor-depended or not). They mimic the observed actual
protocol followed by the negotiation process for the setting of a military base
in Pontevedra, Spain, and cover other potential situations such as negotia-
tions between the mining industry and indigenous communities.
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Our model is simple in the sense that it makes very strong simplifica-
tions, such as a common reservation price for each lessor and the perfect
substitutability of land. Yet quite relevant results are obtained.
First, and quite counter-intuitively, a lessor-independent price is much
favorable for the tenant than when she has freedom to agree on a different
price for each lessor. This is due to the fact that, when the tenant negotiates
with the first lessors, she can claim a lower price arguing that, otherwise, she
would have to pay that same price to everyone and that would be unfeasible.
A key issue is the impossibility of renegotiation once breakdown happens.
Even though allowing the tenant to continue negotiating repeatedly until get-
ting E units of the land seems a reasonable option, a clear deadline should
also be stated. As commented in the motivating example of Spain, the se-
quential bargaining was done after more than one year of previous meetings,
where many offers and counteroffers were made. At the end, the day arrived
which all the agents seemly understood to be the last possible chance to get
an agreement. Everything that had happened before was cheap talk with no
strategic commitment. Sequential models with no chance of renegotiation
are also common in the literature. We can mention, for example, Bennett
and van Damme (1991), Selten (1992), Winter (1994), Dasgupta and Chiu
(1998), Bag and Winter (1999), Vidal-Puga (2004) and Vidal-Puga (2008).
A complementary approach to this problem is the axiomatic one: Apart
form arising as a result of a reasonable process of decentralized negotiation,
we may wonder if our equilibrium payoff allocations have some nice prop-
erties, or axioms, that make them also suitable from a centralized point of
view. The answer is affirmative for the equilibrium payoff allocation given in
Theorem 4.2. In Valencia-Toledo and Vidal-Puga (2018), this payoff alloca-
tion coincides with the one proposed by a rule denoted ψ2 and characterized
by self-duality, price-independence, and standard for two. In Valencia-Toledo
and Vidal-Puga (2019), it is denoted ψ
1
2 and characterized using a property of
reassignment-proofness and standard for two. Other payoff allocations such
as the Shapley (1953) value also have both strong axiomatic justifications
28
and non-cooperative foundations. For the Shapley value, non-cooperative
games include Gul (1989, 1999); Winter (1994); Hart and Mas-Colell (1996);
Mc Quillin and Sugden (2016). However, these non-cooperative foundations
need at least to use stationary subgame perfect equilibrium instead of the
more general subgame perfect equilibrium as used here.
Another relevant feature is that, despite the perfect information setting
and von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, there arise bargaining prob-
lems with non-convex sets of feasible agreements. Failure of convexity com-
promises the uniqueness of the Nash bargaining solution. Yet, the Nash
bargaining solution is unique in all the subclasses and examples of games
that we have studied, and we suspect this could be a general result.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We prove the following (stronger) result:
Given (ai)
s−1
i=1 ∈ As−1 where ai = (pi, xi) for all i < s in stage
s, and βs = K − (∑i<s pici + r∑i≥s ci), as ρ approaches 1, the
final payoff allocation approaches(
βs
2n−s+1
, (p1 − r)c1, . . . , (ps−1 − r)cs−1, β
s
2
,
βs
22
, . . . ,
βs
2n−s+1
)
if βs > 0 and xi = ci for all i < s, and (0, . . . , 0) if β
s < 0 or
xi < ci for some i < s.
We proceed by backward induction on s.
Assume s = n. Let (ai)
n−1
i=1 ∈ An−1 with ai = (xi, pi) for all i < n. In case∑
i<n xi < E − cn, then there is not enough land left and the final payoff is
zero for everyone. Since E = c(N),
∑
i<n xi < E − cn implies xi < ci for
some i < n. For the same reason,
∑
i<n xi ≥ E − cn implies xi = ci for all
i < n. Hence,
∑
i<n xi ≥ E − cn implies
∑
i<n xi = E − cn.
If βn < 0, then the prices are too high and agreement is not possible, so
the final payoff is zero for everyone.
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Assume now βn > 0 and xi = ci for all i < n. Then, the tenant and lessor
n face the bargaining problem (Dn, dn) with dn = (0, 0).
An efficient agreement implies xn = cn. So, the Pareto frontier of D
n is:
∂Dn =
{
(u0 (a
n) , un (a
n)) ∈ R2 : pn ≥ 0, xn = cn
}
.
The Nash solution is obtained by the maximization problem
max {u0un : (u0, un) ∈ ∂Dn} = max
{(
K −
∑
i∈N
pici
)
(pn − r)cn : pn ≥ 0
}
= max {(βn + rcn − pncn) (pn − r)cn : pn ≥ 0}
where the unique maximum is reached at p∗n =
βn+2rcn
2cn
. Given this, it is
straightforward to check that the final payoff allocation (as ρ approaches 1)
becomes: (
βn
2
, (p1 − r)c1, . . . , (pn−1 − r)cn−1, β
n
2
)
.
So, the hypothesis is satisfied for stage s = n.
We now consider stage s.
Assume that the result is true in stage s+1 for s < n. Let (ai)
s−1
i=1 ∈ As−1
with ai = (xi, pi) for all i < s. By analogous reasoning as in stage n, we
deduce that in case
∑
i<s xi < E −
∑
i≥s ci, there is not enough land left
and the final payoff is zero for everyone, and
∑
i<s xi ≥ E −
∑
i≥s ci implies∑
i<s xi = E −
∑
i≥s ci.
If βs < 0, then the prices are too high and agreement is not possible, so
the final payoff is zero for everyone.
Assume now βs > 0 and xi = ci for all i < s. The tenant and lessor s
face the bargaining problem (Ds, ds) with ds = (0, 0).
An efficient agreement implies xs = cs. So, the Pareto frontier of D
s is:
∂Ds =
{
(u0 (a
s) , us (a
s)) ∈ R2 : ps ≥ 0, xs = cs
}
.
The Nash solution is obtained by the maximization problem, which is
given as follows. By induction hypothesis, given that the payoff for the
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tenant in stage s+ 1 is β
s+1
2n−s
, max{u0us : (u0, us) ∈ ∂Ds} is equal to
max
{
βs+1
2n−s
(ps − r)cs : ps ≥ 0
}
where the unique maximum is reached at p∗s =
βs+2rcs
2cs
. Given this, the final
payoff allocation (as ρ approaches 1) is:(
βs
2n−s+1
, (p1 − r)c1, . . . , (ps−1 − r)cs−1, β
s
2
,
βs
22
, . . . ,
βs
2n−s+1
)
.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We define π∗ : R+ → R+ as π∗(p) = max
{
p, K+rE
2E
}
.
We prove the following (stronger) result:
Given (ai)
s−1
i=1 ∈ As−1 with ai = (pi, xi) for all i < s at stage s, and p′s−1 =
maxi<s{pi} (for notational convenience, we assume p′0 = 0 when s = 1), the
final price is π∗
(
p′s−1
)
and the final payoff allocation (as ρ approaches 1)
becomes (
K − rE
2
,
K − rE
2E
c1, . . . ,
K − rE
2E
cn
)
(6)
if p′s−1 <
K+rE
2E
< K
E
and xi = ci for all i < s,
(
K − p′s−1E,
(
p′s−1 − r
)
c1, . . . ,
(
p′s−1 − r
)
cn
)
(7)
if K+rE
2E
≤ p′s−1 ≤ KE and xi = ci for all i < s, and
(0, . . . , 0) (8)
if p′s−1 >
K
E
or xi < ci for some i < s.
For any stage s ∈ N , in case p′s−1 > KE or xi < ci for any i < s, there is
no possible agreement, so the final payoff is zero for everyone, as stated in
(8). Hence, from now on, we assume p′s−1 ≤ KE and xi = ci for all i < s.
We proceed by backward induction on s.
Assume s = n. Let (ai)
n−1
i=1 ∈ An−1 with ai = (pi, xi) for all i < n. The
tenant and lessor n face the bargaining problem (Dˆn, dˆn) with dˆn = (0, 0).
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An efficient agreement is only possible when xn = cn and pn ≤ KE , so the
Pareto frontier of Dˆn is:
∂Dˆn =
{
(u0 (aˆ
n) , u0 (aˆ
n)) ∈ R2 : pn ≤ K
E
, xn = cn
}
=
{
(K − p′nE, (p′n − r)xn) : pn ≤
K
E
, xn = cn
}
=
{
(K − pnE, (pn − r)cn) : p′n−1 ≤ pn ≤
K
E
}
.
The Nash solution is obtained by the maximization problem:
max
{
u0un : (u0, un) ∈ ∂Dˆn
}
= max
{
(K − pnE)(pn − r)cn : p′n−1 ≤ pn ≤
K
E
}
.
The product u0un determines a concave parabola whose vertex is at
K+rE
2E
.
We have the following three cases:
First Case: If p′n−1 <
K+rE
2E
< K
E
, the maximum is reached at p∗n =
K+rE
2E
.
By definition, π∗(p′n−1) = max{p′n−1, K+rE2E } = K+rE2E . Then, the final price
is π∗(p′n−1) =
K+rE
2E
. From this, it is straightforward to check that the final
payoff allocation is given as in (6).
Second Case: If K+rE
2E
≤ p′n−1 ≤ KE , the maximum is reached at p∗n = p′n−1.
The final price is π∗(p′n−1) = p
′
n−1. From this, it is straightforward to check
that the final payoff allocation is given as in (7).
Third Case: If K+rE
2E
≥ K
E
, we deduce that rE ≥ K which is a contradic-
tion because of the condition rE < K. Therefore, this case is not possible.
We now consider stage s.
Assume that the result is true in stage s+1 for s < n. Let (ai)
s−1
i=1 ∈ As−1
with ai = (pi, xi) for all i < s. The tenant and lessor s face the bargaining
problem (Dˆs, dˆs) with dˆs = (0, 0). An efficient agreement is only possible
when xs = cs and ps ≤ KE . By induction hypothesis, the price is π∗(p′s). So
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the Pareto frontier of Dˆs is:
∂Dˆs =
{
(u0(aˆ
s), us(aˆ
s)) ∈ R2 : ps ≤ K
E
, xs = cs
}
=
{
(K − π∗(p′s)E, (π∗(p′s)− r) xs) : ps ≤
K
E
, xs = cs
}
=
{
(K − π∗(ps)E, (π∗(ps)− r) cs) : p′s−1 ≤ ps ≤
K
E
}
.
The Nash solution is obtained by the maximization problem max{u0us :
(u0, us) ∈ ∂Dˆs}, or equivalently,
max
{
(K − π∗(ps)E)(π∗(ps)− r)cs : p′s−1 ≤ ps ≤
K
E
}
.
Since π∗(ps) is constant for ps ≤ K+rE2E , the maximization problem can be
rewritten as
max
{
(K − psE)(ps − r)cs : π∗
(
p′s−1
) ≤ ps ≤ K
E
}
.
The product (K−psE)(ps−r)cs determines a concave parabola whose vertex
is at K+rE
2E
.
Now, we have the following three cases:
First Case: If p′s−1 <
K+rE
2E
< K
E
, since π∗(p′s−1) = max{p′s−1, K+rE2E },
we deduce π∗(p′s−1) =
K+rE
2E
. Hence, π∗(p′s−1) ≤ K+rE2E ≤ KE , and thus the
maximum is reached at p∗s =
K+rE
2E
. Then, the final price is K+rE
2E
= π∗(p′s−1).
From this, it is straightforward to check that the final payoff allocation is
given as in (6).
Second Case: If K+rE
2E
≤ p′s−1 ≤ KE , since π∗(p′s−1) = max{p′s−1, K+rE2E },
we deduce π∗(p′s−1) = p
′
s−1. Hence,
K+rE
2E
≤ π∗(p′s−1) ≤ KE , and thus the max-
imum is reached at p∗s = π
∗(p′s−1). Then, the final price is p
′
s−1 = π
∗(p′s−1).
From this, it is straightforward to check that the final payoff allocation is
given as in (7).
Third Case: If K+rE
2E
≥ K
E
, we deduce that rE ≥ K which is a contra-
diction, because of the hypothesis condition rE < K. Therefore, this case is
not possible.
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Proof of Theorem 5.1. Assume first E ≤ c1, c2. The tenant, in case she
does not reach an agreement with lessor 1 in stage 1, will face a bargain-
ing problem (D2, d2) in stage 2 with lessor 2 with d2 = (0, 0) and D2 =
{(u0, u2) ∈ R2 : u0 + u2 ≤ K − rE}. The Nash solution is
(
K−rE
2
, K−rE
2
)
.
Hence, the expected final payoff for the tenant, provided there is disagree-
ment in stage 1, is K−rE
2
. From this, in stage 1, the tenant and lessor 1 face
a bargaining problem (D1, d1) with d1 =
(
K−rE
2
, 0
)
and
D1 =
{
(K − p1x1, (p1 − r) x1) : (p1, x1) ∈ ∆0
}
where
∆0 = {(p1, x1) ∈ [r,∞[× [E, c1] : p1x1 ≤ K} .
Now, any agreement (p1, x1) ∈ ∆0 with x1 > E is Pareto dominated by
(p′1, x
′
1) =
(
p1x1
E
, E
)
. Hence, we can rewrite D1 as
D1 =
{
(K − p1E, (p1 − r)E) : p1 ∈
[
r,
K
E
]}
.
The Nash solution for (D1, d1) maximizes
(
K − p1E − K−rE2
)
(p1−r)E. This
maximum is at p∗1 =
3r
4
+ K
4E
, so that the final payoff allocation, when ρ→ 1,
becomes
(
3K−rE
4
, K−rE
4
, 0
)
.
Assume now c2 < E ≤ c1 or c2 < E ≤ c1. The smallest lessor is a dummy,
so the tenant and the other lessor will equally share K−rE, and the dummy
receives zero.
Finally, assume E > c1, c2. Assume that the tenant and lessor 1 agree
on some (p1, x1) ∈ [0,∞[ × [0, c1] in stage 1. In order for agreement to be
possible in stage 2, suppose x1 ≥ E − c2 and (p1 − r) x1 ≤ K − rE. Now, in
stage 2, any individually rational choice (p2, x2) with x2 > E − x1 is Pareto
dominated by (p′2, x
′
2) with p
′
2 =
x2
E−x1p2 and x
′
2 = E − x1. Hence, the tenant
and lessor 2 face a bargaining problem (D2, d2) with d2 = (0, 0) and
D2 =
{
(K − p1x1 − (E − x1) p2, (p2 − r) (E − x1)) : p2 ∈ ∆2
}
where ∆2 =
[
r, K−p1x1
E−x1
]
. Taking α = (E − x1) p2, we can rewrite D2 as
D2 = {(K − p1x1 − α, α− (E − x1) r) : α ∈ [(E − x1) r,K − p1x1]}
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equivalently (see Figure 1 - Right),
D2 = {(u0, u2) ∈ R2 : u0 + u2 ≤ K − rE − (p1 − r)x1} .
By symmetry and efficiency, the Nash solution gives both players the
same utility K−rE−(p1−r)x1
2
and it is uniquely determined with x2 = E − x1
and p2 =
K−p1x1
2(E−x1) +
r
2
.
Given this, the bargaining problem in stage 1 is (D1, d1) given by d1 =
(0, 0) and
D1 =
{(
K − rE − (p1 − r)x1
2
, (p1 − r) x1
)
: (p1, x1) ∈ ∆1
}
where
∆1 = {(p1, x2) ∈ [0,∞[× [E − c2, c1] : (p1 − r) x1 ≤ K − rE} .
Taking β = (p1 − r) x1, we can rewrite D1 as
D1 =
{(
K−rE−β
2
, β
)
: β ∈ [−rc1, K − rE]
}
equivalently (Figure 2),
D1 = {(u0, u2) : 2u0 + u2 ≤ K − rE} .
The Nash solution maximizes (K − rE − β) β. This maximium is at βo =
K−rE
2
. Hence the final payoff allocation , when ρ→ 1, becomes(
K − rE − βo
2
, βo,
K − rE − βo
2
)
=
(
K − rE
4
,
K − rE
2
,
K − rE
4
)
.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. We focus on the case c1, c2 < E. The proof for the
other cases is analogous to the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Assume that the tenant and lessor 1 agree on some (p1, x1) ∈ [0,∞[×[0, c1]
in stage 1. In order for agreement to be possible in stage 2, we also assume
x1 ≥ E − c2 and p1 ≤ KE . Given this, the tenant and lessor 2 face the
bargaining problem
(
Dˆ2, dˆ2
)
with dˆ2 = (0, 0) and
Dˆ2 =
{
(K − (x1 + x2) p2, (p2 − r) x2) : (p2, x2) ∈ ∆2
}
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where
∆2 = [p1,∞[× [E − x1, c2] .
The individually rational Pareto frontier of Dˆ2 are the points (u0, g2 (u0)),
where u0 ∈ [0, K − p1E] and g2 (u0) is a function defined as follows: g2(u0)
the maximum of (p2 − r) x2 subject to p2 ≥ p1, p2 ≥ r, E − x1 ≤ x2 ≤ c2
and K − (x1 + x2) p2 = u0.
Assume first r = 0, this means that g2(u0) reaches its maximum at x2 =
c2. Thus, we have that g2(u0) =
K−u0
x1+c2
c2.
Assume now r > 0. The maximization is equivalent to maximizing the
function
f (x2) :=
(
K − u0
x1 + x2
− r
)
x2
on the interval x2 ∈
[
E − x1,min
{
c2,
K−u0
max{r,p1} − x1
}]
.
Since max{r, p1} > 0, and for any admissible u0, the unique global non-
negative maximum of f is at
xo2 :=
√
x1
r
(K − u0)− x1
associated to the price po2 =
√
(K−u0)r
x1
.
We distinguish three cases:
Case 1 If xo2 < E−x1 or, equivalently, u0 > K − rE
2
x1
, the unique maximum
is at x2 = E − x1 (with p2 = K−u0E ), and it gives
g2 (u0) = f (E − x1) =
(
K − u0
E
− r
)
(E − x1) = E − x1
E
(K − rE − u0)
which implies that, for u0 > K − rE2x1 , the frontier of Dˆ2 is a line with
slope −E−x1
E
.
Case 2 If xo2 ≥ min
{
c2,
K−u0
max{r,p1} − x1
}
, we have two subcases:
Case 2a If c2 ≤ K−u0max{r,p1} − x1 and xo2 ≥ c2, or, equivalently, u0 ≤ K −
(x1 + c2)max
{
max{r, p1}, x1+c2x1 r
}
, the maximum is at x2 = c2
36
(with p2 =
K−u0
x1+c2
), and it gives
g2 (u0) = f (c2) =
c2
x1 + c2
(K − (x1 + c2) r − u0)
which implies that, for u0 ≤ K − (x1 + c2)max
{
p1,
x1+c2
x1
r
}
, the
frontier of Dˆ2 is a line with slope − c2
x1+c2
.
Case 2b If c2 ≥ K−u0max{r,p1} −x1 and xo2 ≥ K−u0max{r,p1} −x1, or, equivalently,
u0 ≥ K− max{r,p1}x1r min
{
max{r, p1}, x1+c2x1 r
}
, the maximum is at
x2 =
K−u0
max{r,p1} − x1 (with p2 = max{r, p1}), and it gives
g2 (u0) = f
(
K − u0
max{r, p1} − x1
)
=
max{r, p1} − r
max{r, p1} (K −max{r, p1}x1 − u0)
which implies that, for
u0 ≥ K − max{r, p1}x1
r
min
{
max{r, p1}, x1 + c2
x1
r
}
,
the frontier of Dˆ2 is a line with slope −max{r,p1}−r
max{r,p1} .
Case 3 In any other case, the maximum is at x2 = x
o
2 (with p2 = p
o
2), and
it is
g2 (u0) = f
(√
x1
r
(K − u0)− x1
)
=
(√
K − u0 −√rx1
)2
which implies that, in some cases, the frontier of D2 is a convex func-
tion.
From these cases allow us to define g2 (u0), for any u0 ∈ [0, K −max {p1, r}E],
as follows:
g2 (u0) =


E−x1
E
(K − rE − u0) if u0 > K − rE2x1
c2
x1+c2
(K − (x1 + c2) r − u0) if u0 ≤ K − (x1 + c2)max
{
max{r, p1}, x1+c2x1 r
}
max{r,p1}−r
max{r,p1}
(K −max{r, p1}x1 − u0) if u0 ≥ K − max{r,p1}x1r min
{
x1+c2
x1
r,max{r, p1}
}
(√
K − u0 −√rx1
)2
otherwise
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for any u0 ∈ [0, K −max {p1, r}E]. Notice that Case 1 only applies when
K − rE2
x1
< K − p1E or, equivalently, p1x1 < rE. In that case, and since
E ≤ x1+ c2, we have max{r, p1} < x1+c2x1 r and hence case 2b reduces to u0 ≥
K − max{r,p1}2x1
r
which implies u0 ≥ K − max{r, p1}E, which is impossible.
Hence, case 1 and case 2b cannot happen simultaneously, and so g2 is well-
defined on the interval [0, K −max {p1, r}E].
Since E ≤ x1 + c2, we have rEx1 ≤ x1+c2x1 r. There are three possibilities
depending on p1x1:
Small p1x1 If p1x1 < rE, then case 2b vanishes:
g2 (u0) =


E−x1
E
(K − rE − u0) if u0 ≥ K − rE2x1
c2
x1+c2
(K − (x1 + c2) r − u0) if u0 ≤ K − (x1+c2)
2
x1
r(√
K − u0 −√rx1
)2
if u0 ∈
[
K − (x1+c2)2
x1
r,K − rE2
x1
]
.
In this case, g2 is convex. There are three candidates for the Nash
solution:
Case 1 us10 =
K−rE
2
only if us10 ≥ K− rE
2
x1
, but this case is not possible
when K is large enough (K > Ks1 := E+c2
E−c2 rE);
Case 2a us20 =
K−(x1+c2)r
2
only if us20 ≤ K − (x1+c2)
2
x1
r, which always
holds for K large enough (K > Ks2 := E+c2
E−c2 (c1 + c2) r); and
Case 3 us30 =
K−rx1
8
(
1−
√
1− 16K
K−rx1
)
only if K− rx1 ≥ 16K, which
is not possible.
Hence, for K = min{Ks1, Ks2} = Ks1 large enough, and for each pair
(x1, p1) with x1p1 < rE, the tenant and lessor 2 will agree on some
(p∗2, x
∗
2) such that the tenant’s final payoff is u
2a
0 (case 2a). This implies
p∗2 = r +
K
(x1+c2)
and x∗2 = c2.
Medium p1x1 If p1x1 ∈ [rE, (x1 + c2) r], then case 1 vanishes:
g2 (u0) =


c2
x1+c2
(K − (x1 + c2) r − u0) if u0 ≤ K − (x1+c2)
2
x1
r
p1−r
p1
(K − p1x1 − u0) if u0 ≥ K − x1r p21(√
K − u0 −√rx1
)2
if u0 ∈
[
K − (x1+c2)2
x1
r,K − x1
r
p21
]
.
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In this case, g2 is again convex and there are three candidates for the
Nash solution :
Case 2a u2a0 =
K−(x1+c2)r
2
only if u2a0 ≤ K − (x1+c2)
2
x1
r, which always
holds for K large enough (K > Ks3 = E+c2
E−c2 (c1 + c2) r);
Case 2b u2b0 =
K−p1x1
2
only if u2b0 ≥ K − x1r p21, which does not hold for
K large enough (K > Ks4 = (c1 + 2c2)
rE
E−c2 ); and
Case 3 u30 =
K−rx1
8
(
1−
√
1− 16K
K−rx1
)
only if K − rx1 ≥ 16K, which
is not possible.
Hence, for K = min{Ks3, Ks4} = Ks4 large enough, and for each pair
(p1, x1) with p1x1 ∈ [rE, (x1 + c2) r], the tenant and lessor 2 will agree
on some (p∗2, x
∗
2) such that the tenant’s final payoff is u
2a
0 (case 2a).
This implies again that p∗2 = r +
K
(x1+c2)
and x∗2 = c2.
Large x1p1 If x1p1 ≥ (x1 + c2) r, then cases 1 and 3 vanish
g2 (u0) =


c2
x1+c2
(K − (x1 + c2) r − u0) if u0 ≤ K − (x1 + c2) p1
p1−r
p1
(K − p1x1 − u0) if u0 ≥ K − (x1 + c2) p1.
In this case, g2 in convex. The (unique) Nash solution if given by:
u∗0 =


u2a0 if u
2a
0 ≤ K − (x1 + c2) p1
u2b0 if u
2b
0 ≥ K − (x1 + c2) p1
K − (c1 + c2) p1 otherwise
which is equivalent to:
u∗0 =


K−(x1+c2)r
2
if p1 ≤ K2(x1+c2) + r2
K−p1x1
2
if p1 ≥ Kx1+2c2
K − (c1 + c2) p1 if p1 ∈
[
K
2(x1+c2)
+ r
2
, K
x1+2c2
]
.
For K large enough (K > Ks5 = (c1 + c2)
(
1 + 2 c2
E−c1
)
r), case p1 ≤
K
2(x1+c2)
+ r
2
is compatible with x1p1 ≥ (x1 + c2) r and hence the three
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cases are nondegenerate. Hence, for each pair (p1, x1) with p1x1 ≥
(x1 + c2) r, the tenant and lessor 2 will agree on some (p
∗
2, x
∗
2) such
that the tenant’s final payoff is u∗0 given as before.
See Figure 3 for three examples of (Dˆ2, dˆ2) for three possible choices of
(p1, x1).
Assume now we are in stage 1 and K is large enough (K > Ks6 =
(c1+2c2)(c1+c2)r
E−c2 ). For each possible agreement (p1, x1), the above cases allow
us to anticipate the agreement
(
p
(p1,x1)
2 , x
(p1,x1)
2
)
in stage 2:
(
p
(p1,x1)
2 , x
(p1,x1)
2
)
=


(
K
2(x1+c2)
+ r
2
, c2
)
if p1 ≤ K2(x1+c2) + r2(
p1,
K
2p1
− x1
2
)
if p1 ≥ Kx1+2c2
(p1, c2) if p1 ∈
[
K
2(x1+c2)
+ r
2
, K
x1+2c2
]
.
(9)
Therefore, we have a bargaining problem
(
Dˆ1, dˆ1
)
with dˆ1 = (0, 0) and
Dˆ1 =
{(
K −
(
x1 + x
(p1,x1)
2
)
p
(p1,x1)
2 ,
(
p
(p1,x1)
2 − r
)
x1
)
: (p1, x1) ∈ ∆ˆ1
}
where ∆ˆ1 =
[
0, K
E
]× [E − c2, c1].
In particular, given an agreement (p1, x1) ∈ ∆ˆ1, the final payoff for the
tenant and lessor 1, as ρ approaches 1, is given by (u∗0, u
∗
1) =

(
K−(x1+c2)r
2
,
K−(x1+c2)r
2(x1+c2)
x1
)
if p1 ≤ K2(x1+c2) + r2(
K−p1x1
2
, (p1 − r) x1
)
if p1 ≥ Kx1+2c2
(K − (x1 + c2) p1, (p1 − r) x1) if p1 ∈
[
K
2(x1+c2)
+ r
2
, K
x1+2c2
]
.
(10)
The Nash solution is given by a pair (p1, x1) that maximizes u
∗
0u
∗
1. Let
u0 ∈ [0, K − rE] be the utility that the tenant can get. The Pareto frontier
of Dˆ1 is determined by a function g1 (u0) which gives the maximum that
lessor 1 can get when the tenant gets u0, i.e.
∂Dˆ1 =
{
(u0, g1(u0)) ∈ R2 : u0 ∈ [0, K − rE]
}
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with g1(u0) the maximum of u
∗
1 subject to u
∗
0 = u0. From (10), we have
three cases depending on p1. If p1 ≤ K2(x1+c2) + r2 , we maximize
K−(x1+c2)r
2(x1+c2)
x1
subject to K−(x1+c2)r
2
= u0, which is equivalent to maximize
ru0x1
K−2u0 . Since it
is increasing on x1, we deduce that the optimal x1 satisfies p1 ≥ K2(x1+c2) + r2 .
If p1 ≥ Kx1+2c2 , we maximize (p1 − r) x1 subject to
K−p1x1
2
= u0, which is
equivalent to maximize K − 2u0 − rx1. Since it is decreasing on x1, we
deduce that the optimal x1 satisfies p1 ≤ Kx1+2c2 .
We then maximize (p1 − r) x1 subject to a K − (x1 + c2) p1 = u0, which
is equivalent to maximize
(
K−u0
x1+c2
− r
)
x1 whose maximum is at
xo1 =
√
(K − u0) c2
r
− c2
Hence, we have three cases depending on wherever xo1 ≥ c1 (equivalently,
u0 ≤ K− (c1+c2)
2r
c2
), xo1 ∈ [E − c2, c1] (equivalently, u0 ∈
[
K − (c1+c2)2r
c2
, K − rE2
c2
]
),
or xo1 ≤ E − c2 (equivalently, u0 ≥ K − rE
2
c2
). The maximum is obtained,
respectively, with (p1, x1) =
(
K−u0
c1+c2
, c1
)
, (p1, x1) =
(√
(K−u0)r
c2
, x01
)
, and
(p1, x1) =
(
K−u0
E
, E − c2
)
. From this, we have
g1(u0) =


c1
c1+c2
(K − (c1 + c2) r − u0) if u0 ≤ K − (c1+c2)
2r
c2(√
K − u0 −√rc2
)2
if u0 ∈
[
K − (c1+c2)2r
c2
, K − rE2
c2
]
1
(E−c2)E (K − rE − u0) if u0 ≥ K − rE
2
c2
which determines the bargaining problem in stage 1 (see Figure 4). For K
large enough (K > Ks7 = 2c1+c2
c2
(c1 + c2) r), the Nash solution determines
u0 =
K−(c1+c2)r
2
as final payoff for the tenant, with (p1, x1) =
(
K
2(c1+c2)
+ r
2
, c1
)
.
From (9), we deduce that, at stage 2, the final agreement, as ρ approaches
1, becomes (p∗2, x
∗
2) =
(
K
2(c1+c2)
+ r
2
, c2
)
and so the final payoff for each lessor
i ∈ {1, 2} becomes ui = (p2 − r)xi = ciK2(c1+c2) − cir2 .
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